1. Keep the actors distinct
AtlaSent distinguishes the organization, initiating human where applicable, agent/workload identity, and downstream executor. A human login does not silently become the agent’s identity or authority.2. Technical access is not organizational authority
An MCP server or tool catalog can make a tool technically callable. That does not establish authority to perform a consequential action.3. Evaluate before the tool effect
For a consequential tool call, submit the protected action and current context to the canonical AtlaSent evaluation path before invoking the effectful operation. Use a sandbox/non-consequential target for the first integration.4. Apply bounded delegation only where it exists
If the organization has explicitly delegated authority to the agent/workload, include the applicable authority context. Never infer delegation from the user’s session, tool availability, or prior successful action.5. Verify the execution artifact
Where the protected action requires a Permit, verify it at the gate immediately before the effect. Material changes to the authorized request require fresh authorization.6. Preserve attribution and evidence
The evidence chain should make it possible to distinguish:- initiating human/organization provenance
- agent/workload identity
- exact protected action
- authority/delegation inputs
- authorization decision
- Permit issuance/verification
- execution/effect evidence, when actually established
Negative case
Give the agent technical access to a safe test tool while withholding the required AtlaSent organizational authority. The action should fail closed at the authorization boundary rather than relying on the tool’s own availability as permission.MCP server integration
Continue with the existing AtlaSent MCP integration reference.