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AtlaSent’s audit export is a tamper-evident, offline-verifiable evidence artifact. Evaluation records are hash-linked in chain order; the exported bundle carries the applicable signature and manifest material needed for independent verification. A successful bundle verification establishes the integrity properties the verifier actually checks — it does not, by itself, prove downstream execution, effect, global completeness, or regulatory compliance.

Export via API

The quickstart key’s audit:read scope is sufficient. The export is newline-delimited JSON — one chain-ordered audit entry per line, carrying the hash-link and signature fields the offline verifier checks. See Verify the audit chain for the full field list and for large exports.

Verify the bundle offline

Use the public atlasent-audit-verify CLI (install and usage). Verify against the public key you pinned from the Audit signing key page, not a key returned by the same channel as the export:
--require-signatures makes an unloaded or wrong key a failure rather than a silent skip. Verification is performed without trusting a live AtlaSent decision at verification time. A successful verification should be read narrowly:
  • the checked chain/hash relationships are intact;
  • the checked signature/trust-root relationship is valid;
  • the checked manifest/digest relationships are consistent;
  • no unsupported verification claim is implied beyond those checks.
It does not mean:
  • an allow was executed;
  • a Permit was necessarily verified at an execution boundary;
  • the provider/native effect occurred;
  • the bundle contains every record that should exist globally;
  • a regulated system is validated or compliant merely because the evidence verifies.
Give the bundle and the applicable public verifier instructions to a reviewer or auditor so they can reproduce the integrity checks independently. For regulated use, keep your validation protocol, procedural controls, record-retention obligations, and trust-root procedures in the review scope as well.

How this supports common control requirements

A tamper-evident, attributable, independently verifiable evidence chain can support controls mapped to requirements such as record protection, secure audit trails, and data-integrity expectations. The exact compliance conclusion remains environment-, procedure-, retention-, configuration-, and validation-dependent. See the relevant compliance mapping pages for the specific AtlaSent control mapping and the customer responsibilities that remain outside the product.

You’re done with this quickstart stage

At this point you should be able to distinguish four separate facts:
  1. ✅ an authorization Decision was recorded;
  2. ✅ a bounded Permit was issued when required by the exercised path;
  3. ✅ Permit Verification succeeded when the quickstart exercised that boundary;
  4. ✅ the resulting audit bundle can be checked for the integrity properties supported by the verifier.
None of those facts should be used to infer a native execution or effect unless the applicable provider/observer evidence establishes it separately. Next: pick an SDK and wire this into a real protected execution topology.

TypeScript SDK

Python SDK

Go SDK