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AtlaSent signs every audit-chain entry with an Ed25519 key. The public half is published here so you can verify an exported audit chain or proof bundle offline, against a key you obtained from this trust center — not from the bundle itself. That independence is the whole point: a bundle that ships its own key proves nothing; a bundle whose signatures verify under the key on this page was signed by AtlaSent.
This is the audit-entry signing key. It is not the export-bundle key and not an API key. Pin the value on this page out-of-band (this page, a signed email, or your contract appendix) and verify against your pinned copy.

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Current key

Corrected 2026-09-12. The key shown here from 2026-06-08 to 2026-09-12 (fingerprint 111a26ca…fb9d69) was wrong and verified no production entry. If you pinned it, discard it and re-pin the key below; anything “verified” under the old key was not verified. No audit entry was altered and this was not a key compromise — see Corrections below.
Save the following as atlasent-audit-key.pem:
Raw base64 (same key, for --pubkey and the ATLASENT_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM shortcut): MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAr0leDQfIerrgVCb8M1shVf6L5Qer0C13qV3Dee70D3o= Confirm the fingerprint before pinning:
How this key was verified before publication (2026-09-12). It was obtained from the production runtime’s own key-export route, which since 2026-09-12 refuses to advertise a key that fails a sign→verify round-trip against its private half. It was then checked offline, with OpenSSL, against seven real production audit-entry signatures sampled across the entire signed history — the two earliest entries (2026-06-07), one each from July and August, and the three most recent (2026-09-11/12) — and all seven verify. Every production entry stamped key_version v1 was signed under this key; there was no rotation.

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Verify with it

Proof bundle (GET /v1/proofs/export → bundle.json) — --pubkey pins this key and ignores the bundle’s own key registry:
--pubkey also accepts the raw-base64 value directly, and the ATLASENT_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM environment variable is honored as an alternative. Audit chain (atlasent-audit-verify Go CLI) — supply the same PEM and require signatures, so an unloaded or wrong key is a failure rather than a silent skip:

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Rotation policy

When the key rotates, the new key_version is added to this page and the old one is kept published indefinitely — every audit entry records the key_version it was signed under, so historical exports stay verifiable forever under their original key. A retired key is no longer used for new signatures but remains valid for verification. A key is marked revoked only on confirmed compromise; revocation intentionally breaks verification of entries signed under it. Publication gate (added 2026-09-12): a public key is added to this page only after it has been shown to verify a current production audit entry offline. A key that has not passed that check is not published, whatever the runtime reports as its configured value.

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Past keys

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Corrections

  • 2026-09-12 (later the same day) — Published the verified key above (8c3d2752…6187c7). It was obtained from the runtime’s self-tested key-export route and verified offline against seven production entries spanning 2026-06-07 → 2026-09-12 (7/7). This is a publication correction only: the runtime always signed with this key; the value published in June was wrong. Also revoked the JWKS entry v2-audit-2026, which never signed anything on production.
  • 2026-09-12 — Withdrew the key published 2026-06-08 after offline verification showed it does not verify production audit-entry signatures. No entry was altered; the hash chain is intact.